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This immigration case hinges on the relationship 
between prescription “drugs” and “controlled substances.”  
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 
U.S.C. §§ 301-399d, prohibits the unlicensed wholesale 




See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t) & 353(e)(2)(A).  Similarly, the 
Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904, 
bans the unauthorized distribution of “controlled substances.”  
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).  Some prescription “drugs” (like 
Oxycontin) are also “controlled substances,” but many (like 
Lipitor, Zithromax, and thousands of other common 
medications) are not.  Importantly, the FDCA’s wholesale 
distribution provisions make no distinction between those 
prescription “drugs” that are “controlled substances” and 
those that are not. 
With this background, we answer two questions.  First, 
is a conviction for violating the FDCA’s wholesale 
distribution provisions an “aggravated felony” — specifically 
“illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of Title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as 
defined in section 924(c) of Title 18)” — under 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101(a)(43)(B) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)?  Second, are these 
FDCA provisions laws “relating to a controlled substance (as 
defined in Section 802 of Title 21)” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)?  Our answer to both questions is no.  
Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, reverse, and 
vacate the order of removal. 
I. Background 
Petitioner Ramone Borrome is a citizen of the 
Dominican Republic, and since August 1996 has been a 
lawful permanent resident of the United States.  In May 2002, 
a Special Agent with the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) filed a criminal complaint against 
him and two other men in federal court.  The next month, a 
grand jury returned a two-count indictment.   
Count One charged the three defendants with having 
“unlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in the 
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unauthorized wholesale distribution in interstate commerce of 
prescription drugs in violation of [21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t) and 
353(e)], to wit, [Borrome, and his two co-defendants] 
distributed the prescription drugs Combivir, Diflucan, 
Oxycontin, Serostim, Viagra, Zerit, [and] Zyprexa without 
being licensed to do so.”1  A.R. at 102 ¶ 1.  Count Two 
alleged a conspiracy.  Significantly, the indictment did not 
charge any of the three defendants with violating the CSA.  
According to his judgment of conviction, Borrome pled guilty 
to Count One while Count Two was dismissed on the 
Government’s motion.2
In June 2010, Borrome was served with a Notice to 
Appear for immigration removal purposes.  He filed a motion 
to terminate, which the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied.  
  The District Court sentenced him to 
four months’ imprisonment followed by four months’ home 
confinement. 
In a written opinion, the IJ found Borrome removable 
under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as 
an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.  The IJ concluded 
that the “hypothetical federal felony test” required him to 
compare the FDCA’s wholesale distribution provisions to the 
CSA to determine whether Borrome’s FDCA conviction is 
analogous to a felony under the CSA.  He noted that the CSA 
makes it a felony to distribute knowingly or intentionally a 
                                              
1 These drugs are prescribed for people with the human 
immunodeficiency virus (Combivir, Serostim, Zerit), fungal 
infections (Diflucan), severe pain (Oxycontin), schizophrenia 
(Zyprexa), and erectile dysfunction (Viagra).  See The 
National Center for Biotechnology Information, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ (last visited July 17, 2012). 
2  There is no plea agreement or plea colloquy transcript in 
the administrative record. 
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controlled substance.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C).  
Turning to Borrome’s indictment, he further noted that 
Borrome pled guilty to distributing Oxycontin, which 
contains the Schedule II controlled substance oxycodone.  See 
21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(1)(xiii).  (None of the other six 
prescription “drugs” listed in Borrome’s indictment contains 
“controlled substances.”)  Thus, the IJ reasoned, “because 
[Borrome’s] offense involved the unauthorized distribution of 
a Schedule II controlled substance,” it is an aggravated felony 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) pursuant to the “hypothetical 
federal felony test.”  A.R. at 40. 
The IJ also found Borrome removable under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) as an alien convicted of violating any law 
“relating to a controlled substance.”  After reiterating the 
reference in Borrome’s indictment to Oxycontin, the IJ 
concluded that Borrome’s conviction “is plainly a violation of 
a law relating to a controlled substance.”  Id. at 42. 
In December 2010, the IJ ordered Borrome removed to 
the Dominican Republic. In March 2011, on the 
Government’s motion, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4).  Borrome timely 
petitioned for review.  Before his counsel could file a motion 
to stay removal, he was removed from the United States. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The IJ had jurisdiction over Borrome’s removal 
proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.  The BIA had 
jurisdiction to review the IJ’s order of removal and its 
underlying denial of Borrome’s motion to terminate under 8 
C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15. 
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We generally have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 
to review final orders of removal from the BIA.  But 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction 
to review any final order of removal against an alien who is 
removable” under, among other provisions, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an 
“aggravated felony” or 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for having 
been convicted of violating a law “relating to a controlled 
substance.”  We have jurisdiction, however, to determine our 
jurisdiction.  In other words, we have jurisdiction to 
determine whether the necessary jurisdiction-stripping facts 
are present in a particular case, specifically (1) whether the 
petitioner is an alien and (2) whether he has been convicted of 
one of the enumerated offenses.  See Papageorgiou v. 
Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 357-58 (3d Cir. 2005); Valansi v. 
Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2002).  Furthermore, 
nothing in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) precludes our review of 
questions of law presented in a petition for review.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
“When the BIA affirms an IJ’s decision without 
opinion, we review the IJ’s decision as the final agency 
determination.”  Konan v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 497, 500 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  We review de novo, without affording the 
Attorney General deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), the purely legal questions of whether a violation of 
particular federal criminal statutes is an “aggravated felony” 
and whether those statutes are laws “relating to a controlled 
substance.”  See Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 207-09 
(3d Cir. 2011); Bobb. v. Att’y Gen., 458 F.3d 213, 217 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2006); Valansi, 278 F.3d at 207-08.3
                                              
3  “We have also previously questioned whether a BIA 





A. Removability Under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B) and 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii):  Conviction for Committing an 
“Aggravated Felony” 
First, we must determine whether — as the IJ 
concluded — Borrome’s conviction for violating the FDCA’s 
wholesale distribution provisions, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t) & 
353(e)(2)(A), is an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101(a)(43)(B) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at 
any time after admission is deportable.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  With respect to a controlled substances 
offense, “aggravated felony” means “illicit trafficking in a 
controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21) 
[the definitional section of the CSA], including a drug 
trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).”  8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).  “[T]he term ‘drug trafficking 
crime’ means any felony punishable under the Controlled 
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled 
                                                                                                     
affirmed without opinion the decision of the IJ pursuant to 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4).”  Ng v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 392, 395 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 
289 n.6 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[I]t would seem to be, at the very 
least, an open question as to whether an IJ’s decision affirmed 
through the streamlining process would be entitled to 
Chevron deference . . . [D]eferring to the reasoning of an IJ 
from which the BIA would be free to depart in other cases 
would seem highly problematic.”); Singh v. Att’y Gen., 383 
F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he BIA, by affirming 
without opinion, gave no considered and authoritative 
agency-wide interpretation of the statute . . . .”). 
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Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or 
chapter 705 of title 46,” which includes the maritime 
controlled substances laws.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). 
We have held, however, that in addition to a federal 
felony conviction for violating any of § 924(c)(2)’s three 
statutes, a state controlled substances conviction may also 
qualify as an “aggravated felony” under § 1101(a)(43)(B).  
When presented with such a conviction, we have applied two 
independent tests to determine whether the conviction is an 
“aggravated felony”:  the “hypothetical federal felony” test 
and the “illicit trafficking element” test.  See, e.g., Evanson v. 
Att’y Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 288-90 (3d Cir. 2008); Garcia v. 
Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2006); Gerbier v. 
Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 313 (3d Cir. 2002).  “Under the 
hypothetical federal felony route, we compare the offense of 
conviction to the federal Controlled Substances Act to 
determine if it is analogous to an offense under that Act.”  
Evanson, 550 F.3d at 289.  “Under the illicit trafficking 
element test, a state felony drug conviction constitutes an 
aggravated felony if it contains a trafficking element.”  Id. 
When applying either the “hypothetical federal felony” 
test or the “illicit trafficking element” test under 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B), “and in making aggravated felony 
determinations in general,” we presumptively start our 
analysis by applying the “formal categorical approach.”  
Garcia, 462 F.3d at 291.  Under this approach, we “‘must 
look only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses,’ 
and may not ‘consider other evidence concerning the 
defendant’s prior crimes,’ including . . . ‘the particular facts 
underlying [a] conviction[].’”  Id. (quoting Singh, 383 F.3d at 
147-48) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 
(1990))).  There are two instances where we may depart from 
the formal categorical approach when conducting an 
aggravated felony analysis:  (1) when “[c]onfronted with a 
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disjunctive statute of conviction, one in which there are 
alternative elements, . . . to determine which of the alternative 
elements was the actual basis for the underlying conviction,” 
Evanson, 550 F.3d at 291; see also Garcia, 462 F.3d at 292; 
Singh, 383 F.3d at 162-63; and (2) when “the language of a 
particular subsection of § 1101(a)(43) — the aggravated 
felony enumerating statute — ‘invites inquiry into the 
underlying facts of the case.’”  Evanson, 550 F.3d at 291-92 
(quoting Nijhawan v. Att’y Gen., 523 F.3d 387, 393 (3d Cir. 
2008)). 
i. Can the “Hypothetical Federal Felony” Test Apply 
to a Conviction for Violating Federal Law? 
As a preliminary matter, we must decide whether the 
“hypothetical federal felony” test can apply to a conviction 
for violating a federal law, like the FDCA, that is not one of 
the three federal controlled substances laws enumerated in 
§ 924(c)(2) and incorporated in § 1101(a)(43)(B).  We hold 
that it can.4
                                              
4 The Government does not defend the IJ’s aggravated felony 
analysis.  Instead, it asks that we remand this case to the BIA 
to give it “an opportunity to re-consider the immigration 
judge’s determination that Mr. Borrome is removable as an 
aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)” if we 
conclude that he is not removable under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for having been convicted of a law 
“relating to a controlled substance.”  Gov. Br. at 17.  
According to the Government, a remand would give the BIA 
“an opportunity to re-consider the [IJ’s] determination that 
the ‘hypothetical federal felony’ approach applies in the 
current situation where the statute of conviction, the FDCA, 




As noted, § 1101(a)(43)(B) incorporates § 924(c)(2), 
which defines a “drug trafficking crime” as “any felony 
punishable under” the CSA, the Controlled Substances 
Import and Export Act, or the maritime controlled substances 
laws.  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (emphasis added).  In this 
statute, “Congress referred to felonies ‘punishable under[,]’ 
not ‘convictions obtained under[,]’” the three enumerated 
statutes.  Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 204 (quoting Matter of Barrett, 
20 I. & N. 171, 175 (BIA 1990)).  Therefore, § 924(c)(2) does 
not require an actual conviction under one of its three laws.  
Id.  A conviction that is hypothetically punishable as a felony 
under one of § 924(c)(2)’s three statutes can also qualify as a 
“drug trafficking crime.”  Id. at 305, 312. 
                                                                                                     
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(2).”  Id. at 17 n.9.  It 
would also give the BIA “an opportunity to re-consider the 
application of the categorical approach to the aggravated 
felony determination in this case.”  Id.   
 
We decline the Government’s request.  When Borrome 
appealed the IJ’s ruling to the BIA, the Government filed a 
motion for summary affirmance, claiming (among other 
things) that “the result reached in the decision under review is 
correct . . . and that the issues on appeal are squarely 
controlled by existing precedent and do not involve the 
application of precedent to . . .  novel facts.”  A.R. at 19.  The 
BIA obliged.  Now the Government is singing a different 
tune.  It gives no good reason why the BIA should have a 
second chance to consider the issues raised on this appeal.  
The BIA had the opportunity to consider the issues and, at the 




Thus far the BIA and our Court have applied this 
“hypothetical federal felony” test only to convictions for 
violating state controlled substances laws.  See, e.g., Evanson, 
550 F.3d at 289-293; Garcia, 462 F.3d at 292-93; Gerbier, 
280 F.3d at 308-11; Matter of Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 536, 541 
(BIA 1992).  Ordinarily when an alien is convicted of 
violating a federal controlled substances law, he is convicted 
under the CSA.  In those cases, there is no need for the 
hypothetical federal felony test because § 924(c)(2) makes an 
actual federal felony conviction under the CSA a “drug 
trafficking crime,” and thus, via § 1101(a)(43)(B), an 
“aggravated felony.”  But in this case the Government argues 
that the FDCA’s wholesale distribution laws create the same 
bases for removability as § 924(c)(2)’s three controlled 
substances laws.5
Notwithstanding the unusual circumstances of this 
case, we conclude that the “hypothetical federal felony” test 
can apply to a conviction for violating a federal law other 
than those enumerated in § 924(c)(2).  There is nothing in the 
text of either § 1101(a)(43)(B) or § 924(c)(2) that limits 
application of the “hypothetical federal felony” test to state 
controlled substances convictions.  In fact, § 1101(a)(43) 
specifically indicates that the term “aggravated felony” 
applies to an offense “whether in violation of Federal or State 
law.”  When applying the test, the key inquiry is simply 
whether the alien’s conviction is hypothetically punishable as 
a felony under any of the three controlled substances laws 
listed in § 924(c)(2). 
 
                                              
5 We have found no precedent for using a conviction under 21 
U.S.C. §§ 331(t) and 353(e)(2)(A) as a basis for removability. 
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ii. Does Borrome’s FDCA Conviction Meet the 
“Hypothetical Federal Felony” Test?  
Having determined that the “hypothetical federal 
felony” test can apply in this case, we turn to whether it is 
met.  To do so, we first consider whether the presumption in 
favor of the categorical approach applies to our analysis.  It is 
well established that the aggravated felony enumerating 
statute at issue here, § 1103(a)(43(B), does not permit 
departure from the categorical approach nor does it invite 
inquiry into the underlying facts of a conviction.  See 
Evanson, 550 F.3d. at 292; Garcia, 462 F.3d at 292.  If we 
were to depart from the categorical approach, we would have 
to find justification for that departure in Borrome’s statutes of 
conviction.  We conclude, however, that the FDCA’s 
wholesale distribution statutes, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t) and 
353(e)(2)(A), do not permit departure from the formal 
categorical approach because they are not “disjunctive” 
statutes that define distinct offenses.  They are instead a 
single offense that is not categorically “punishable under” any 
of § 924(c)(2)’s three controlled substances statutes.  
Therefore, a conviction under these FDCA provisions fails 
the “hypothetical federal felony” test. 
We begin by unraveling what Borrome’s statutes of 
conviction, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t) and 353(e), actually prohibit.  
In pertinent part, § 331(t) prohibits “the distribution of drugs 
in violation of section 353(e) of this title.”6
                                              
6 A “drug” means 
  Section 
 
(A) articles recognized in the 
official United States 
Pharmacopeia, official 
Homeopathic Pharmacopeia of 
13 
 
353(e)(2)(A), in turn, provides that “[n]o person may engage 
in the wholesale distribution in interstate commerce of drugs 
subject to subsection (b) of this section in a State unless such 
person is licensed by the State in accordance with the 
guidelines issued under subparagraph (B).”  “The term 
‘wholesale distribution’ means distribution of drugs subject to 
subsection (b) of this section to other than the consumer or 
patient,” with some exceptions not relevant here.  21 U.S.C. 
§ 353(e)(3)(B).  Section 353(b)(1) — the relevant part of the 
“subsection (b) of this section” to which §§ 353(e)(2)(A) and 
353(e)(3)(B) refer — subjects to certain prescription 
requirements  
[a] drug intended for use by a man 
which (A) because of its toxicity 
or other potentiality for harmful 
effect, or the method of its use, or 
                                                                                                     
the United States, or official 
National Formulary, or any 
supplement to any of them; and 
(B) articles intended for use in the 
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of 
disease in man or other animals; 
and (C) articles (other than food) 
intended to affect the structure or 
any function of the body of man 
or other animals; and (D) articles 
intended for use as a component 
of any article specified in clause 
(A), (B), or (C). 
 
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1). 
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the collateral measures necessary 
to its use, is not safe for use 
except under the supervision of a 
practitioner licensed by law to 
administer such drug; or (B) is 
limited by an approved 
application under section 355 of 
this title to use under the 
professional supervision of a 
practitioner licensed by law to 
administer such drug. 
For simplicity, these are called prescription drugs. 
Section 353(b)(1) does not provide a list of specific 
drugs subject to its prescription requirements.  Whether a 
drug is a prescription drug by virtue of § 353(b)(1)(A) is a 
question of fact for the jury.  See United States v. Munoz, 430 
F.3d 1357, 1367 (11th Cir. 2005).  The FDA does, however, 
publish in what is colloquially known as the “Orange Book” a 
list of what are prescription drugs by virtue of § 353(b)(1)(B) 
because they are “limited by an approved application under 
section 355 of [title 21] to use under the professional 
supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer 
such drug.”  See  U.S.  Food  &  Drug  Admin.,  U.S.  Dep’t  
of  Health  &  Human  Servs.,  Approved  Drug  Products 
with  Therapeutic  Equivalence  Evaluations  3-1  to  3-424 
(32d ed. 2012), available at  
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApproval
Process/UCM071436.pdf. 
The term “controlled substance” appears nowhere in 
§§ 331(t) and 353(e).  A “controlled substance” is defined in 
the CSA to mean “a drug or other substance, or immediate 
precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of 
this subchapter.”  21 U.S.C. § 802(6).  A list of “controlled 
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substances” is provided in 21 U.S.C. § 812 and supplemented 
by 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11–.15.  The only way to discern an 
overlap between prescription drugs and controlled substances 
is to compare the list of prescription drugs in the FDA’s 
Orange Book and the list of controlled substances in the CSA 
and its corresponding regulations.  When doing so, it is clear 
that, while some prescription drugs contain chemicals that are 
also regulated as “controlled substances” under the CSA, 
many do not.  For example, Oxycontin — one of the seven 
drugs listed in Borrome’s indictment — is a prescription 
drug, see Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations, supra, at 3-324, and it contains the 
“controlled substance” oxycodone, see 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1308.12(b)(1)(xiii).  In contrast, Viagra — another of the 
seven drugs listed in Borrome’s indictment — is a 
prescription drug, see Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations at 3-371, but it does not 
contain a “controlled substance.” 
Although some prescription drugs do contain 
controlled substances, §§ 331(t) and 353(e)(2)(A) make no 
distinction between convictions involving prescriptions drugs 
that do contain controlled substances and those that do not.  
In other words, under §§ 331(t) and 353(e)(2)(A), a 
conviction for the unlicensed wholesale distribution of Viagra 
is no different than a conviction for the unlicensed wholesale 
distribution of Oxycontin.   
This is the pivot point for our “hypothetical federal 
felony” analysis.  When making aggravated felony 
determinations under § 1101(a)(43)(B), “[w]e must rely only 
on ‘what the convicting court must necessarily have found to 
support the conviction.’”  Jeune v. Att’y Gen., 476 F.3d 199, 
205 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 
130, 135 (3d Cir. 2001)).  When Borrome pled guilty to 
violating the FDCA’s wholesale distribution provisions, the 
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convicting court did not necessarily have to find whether the 
prescriptions drugs involved also contained controlled 
substances.  Such a finding would be irrelevant under 
§§ 331(t) and 353(e)(2)(A) because those statutes define a 
single offense, not separate and distinct offenses.  Therefore, 
§§ 331(t) and 353(e)(2)(A) do not permit departure from the 
formal categorical approach. 
When we apply the categorical approach, we see 
daylight between the elements of a CSA controlled 
substances distribution conviction and an FDCA prescription 
drug distribution conviction.  Under the CSA, it is unlawful to 
“knowingly or intentionally . . . distribute . . . a controlled 
substance.”  21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  Under the FDCA, it is 
unlawful to “engage in the wholesale distribution in interstate 
commerce of [prescription] drugs” without a proper license.  
21 U.S.C. § 353(e)(2)(A).  As our discussion above 
demonstrates, prescription drugs and controlled substances do 
not always go hand-in-hand.  If the Government successfully 
proves the elements for a conviction under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 353(e)(2)(A), it does not necessarily prove the elements for 
a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  Because a 
conviction under the FDCA for the unlicensed wholesale 
distribution of prescription drugs is not categorically 
“punishable under” the CSA or § 924(c)(2)’s other controlled 
substances laws, Borrome’s conviction fails the “hypothetical 
federal felony test.” 
iii. The “Illicit Trafficking” Element Test 
Neither the Government before us, nor the IJ, contends 
that Borrome’s conviction meets the “illicit trafficking 
element” test.  That test requires that a felony contain a 
“trafficking element,” meaning “the unlawful trading or 
dealing of a controlled substance.”  Jeune, 476 F.3d at 202 
(quoting Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 305).  Because, as discussed 
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above, §§ 331(t) and 353(e)(2)(A) do not permit departure 
from the categorical approach and they do not require the 
distribution of a controlled substance, they must necessarily 
fail the “illicit trafficking element” test as well. 
B. Removability Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i):  
Conviction for Violating Any Law “Relating to a 
Controlled Substance” 
Next, we consider whether Borrome was removable 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  That section of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1537, provides that: 
Any alien who at any time after 
admission has been convicted of a 
violation of (or a conspiracy or 
attempt to violate) any law or 
regulation of a State, the United 
States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance 
(as defined in section 802 of Title 
21), other than a single offense 
involving possession for one’s 
own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana, is deportable. 
(Emphases added.) 
Unless an alien claims that the basis of his alleged 
removability is “a single offense involving possession for 
one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana,” 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) does not ask courts to scour an alien’s 
indictment and sniff out a controlled substance, or otherwise 
to look to the underlying facts of an alien’s conviction, to 
determine whether the alien is removable.  Such an inquiry 
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would be irrelevant.  The important statutory phrase is 
“relating to a controlled substance,” and it modifies “law or 
regulation.”  See Mielewczyk v. Holder, 575 F.3d 992, 994 
(9th Cir. 2009); see also Mizrahi v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 156, 
159 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), which is the inadmissibility 
counterpart to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), “applies only if 
the ‘law or regulation’ violated relates to controlled 
substances”).  An analysis of the laws or regulations of 
conviction is required.  Therefore, our task is to determine 
whether the FDCA’s wholesale distribution provisions, 21 
U.S.C. §§ 331(t) and 353(e)(2)(A), are laws “relating to a 
controlled substance,” not (as the IJ seems to have believed) 
whether the facts of Borrome’s conviction “relat[e] to a 
controlled substance.”7
The INA does not define the phrase “relating to.”  But 
the BIA has interpreted it expansively:  “[t]he ‘relating to’ 
concept has a broad ordinary meaning, namely, ‘to stand in 
some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to 
bring into association with or connection with.”’ Matter of 
Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118, 120 (BIA 2009) (quoting 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979) (other quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Matter of Beltran, 20 I. & N. Dec. 
521, 526 (BIA 1992) (“The phrase ‘relating to’ . . . has long 
been construed to have broad coverage.”).  The Supreme 
Court, when interpreting the phrase “relating to” in the 
Airline Deregulation Act, has also adopted the broad Black’s 
Law Dictionary definition.  See Morales v. Trans World 
 
                                              
7 As discussed above, the FDCA wholesale distribution 
provisions are non-divisible statutes that define a single 
offense.  Therefore, we apply the formal categorical approach 




Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)). 
We too have explained, in the context of another 
provision of the INA, that the phrase “relating to” is “to be 
read expansively[,] and ‘must not be strictly confined to its 
narrowest meaning.’”  Denis, 633 F.3d at 209 (quoting 
Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 2001)).  As we 
have said, “[t]he term ‘relate’ means ‘to show or establish a 
logical or causal connection between.’”  Bobb, 458 F.3d at 
219 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
(Unabridged) 1916 (1991)).  Other Courts of Appeals have 
given the phrase similarly broad readings.  See Mielewczyk, 
575 F.3d at 994-95 (quoting Webster’s dictionary definition 
with approval); Desai v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 762, 764 (7th Cir. 
2008) (same). 
As the breadth of the phrase “relating to” suggests, a 
law need not require for its violation the actual involvement 
of a controlled substance in order to “relat[e] to” a controlled 
substance.  “If Congress wanted a one-to-one correspondence 
between the [laws of conviction] and the federal CSA, it 
would have used a word like ‘involving’ instead of ‘relating 
to,’ or it could have written the statute the way that it wrote 
§ 1101(a)(43)(B) [the aggravated felony controlled 
substances statute].”  Desai, 520 F.3d at 766.8
In this vein, the BIA and several of our sister Courts of 
Appeals have held that a law prohibiting the possession or use 
of drug paraphernalia is a law “relating to a controlled 
substance.”  See Matter of Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 118; 
 
                                              
8  For example, to achieve this correspondence, Congress 
could have made removable any alien convicted of an offense 
“involving a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 
of Title 21)” or an offense “punishable under” the CSA.   
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see also Alvarez-Acosta v. Att’y Gen., 524 F.3d 1191, 1196 
(11th Cir. 2008); Escobar Barraza v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 388, 
390-91 (7th Cir. 2008); Luu-Le v. I.N.S, 224 F.3d 911, 914-16 
(9th Cir. 2000).  Paraphernalia statutes relate to controlled 
substances, even though they prohibit the possession of 
instruments rather than controlled substances themselves, 
because “the possession of an item intentionally used for 
manufacturing, using, testing, or enhancing the effect of a 
controlled substance necessarily pertains to a controlled 
substance.”  Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 120.  The Ninth 
Circuit has reached this conclusion notwithstanding that the 
definition of the term “drug” as used in the California drug 
paraphernalia statute “does not map perfectly” with the 
definition of “controlled substance” under the CSA.  See Luu-
Le, 224 F.3d at 915.   
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held that a statute 
prohibiting the unlawful delivery of a “Look-Alike 
Substance” is a law “relating to a controlled substance.”  
Desai, 520 F.3d at 764-66.  The defendant in that case was 
convicted of selling chocolates purporting to contain, but not 
actually containing, the hallucinogenic controlled substance 
Psilocybin.  Id. at 763.  He was charged under Illinois law 
with the unlawful delivery of a “Look-Alike Substance,” 
defined as a substance which (1) by its identifying physical 
characteristics “would lead a reasonable person to believe that 
the substance is a controlled substance, or (2) is expressly or 
impliedly represented to be a controlled substance or is 
distributed under circumstances which would lead a 
reasonable person to believe that the substance is a controlled 
substance.”  Id. at 764-65 (quoting 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
570/102(y)).  The Court explained that the state law is one 
“related to” a federal controlled substance because 
distributing something that would lead one to believe it 
contained a federal controlled substance brings the state law 
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“into association with a federal controlled substance.”  Id. at 
765.   
It is the fact that there is a relation 
between the Look-Alike and the 
controlled substance that justifies 
making the distribution of the 
Look-Alike illegal. To put it more 
bluntly, the idea of distributing a 
“Psilocybin Look-Alike” would 
not even exist as a legal (or 
linguistic) concept without its 
connection to, or relationship 
with, Psilocybin. The simulacrum 
and the thing itself are always 
connected. 
Id.  Therefore, according to the Seventh Circuit, the law 
relates to a controlled substance, notwithstanding that a 
“Look-Alike” itself is not a “controlled substance,” as there is 
“enough of a relation to the federal controlled substance to 
warrant removal from the United States for violating the 
law.”  Id. at 766. 
The drug paraphernalia cases and the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Desai convince us that the phrase “any law . . . 
relating to a controlled substance” reaches those laws that do 
not require the actual involvement of a controlled substance 
for a conviction.  But we are equally convinced that a law 
does not automatically come within the ambit of that phrase 
simply because a conviction may involve a controlled 
substance.  Another section of the FDCA provides a reductio 
ad absurdum. 
Under 21 U.S.C. § 353(d)(3)(B), “[d]rug 
manufacturers or authorized distributors of record shall store 
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drug samples under conditions that will maintain their 
stability, integrity, and effectiveness and will assure that the 
drug samples will be free of contamination, deterioration, and 
adulteration” when distributing the drug samples (unless they 
use mail or common carrier).  Distributing drug samples in 
violation of § 353(d), or otherwise failing to comply with its 
requirements, is punishable by not more than one year 
imprisonment, a $1,000 fine, or both.  See 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 331(t) & 333(a).  If we were to give the phrase “relating 
to” a boundless interpretation, we might conclude that 
§ 353(d)(3)(B) is a law “relating to” a controlled substance 
because it regulates some chemicals that also happen to 
contain “controlled substances.”  It would be difficult to 
accept, however, that a non-citizen authorized distributor who 
fails to transport a sample of Oxycontin under the proper 
temperature or in the proper container, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 353(d)(3)(B), could be deported from the United 
States simply because Oxycontin — in addition to being a 
prescription “drug”— also happens to contain a “controlled 
substance.”  The coincidental possibility that a controlled 
substance might be involved with the violation of a law or 
regulation is not enough to make that law or regulation one 
“relating to a controlled substance” for deportability purposes 
under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).   
Though we must interpret the phrase “relating to a 
controlled substance” broadly, that phrase must have limits, 
lest it be bent beyond all logical meaning.  See Denis, 633 
F.3d at 212 (noting that we must interpret the phrase 
“‘relating to’ broadly, seeking a logical or causal 
connection”).  We believe that bringing the FDCA’s 
wholesale distribution provisions within the scope of that 
phrase would extend it beyond its breaking point for two 
related reasons.  First, the connection between §§ 331(t), 
353(e)(2)(A), and illicit controlled substance-related activity, 
is too attenuated.  Second, §§ 331(t) and 353(e)(2)(A) 
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criminalize a substantial swath of conduct with no nexus to 
controlled substances as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802.  
In this case there is undeniably a connection between 
the FDCA wholesale distribution provisions and illicit 
controlled substance-related activity:  the FDCA prohibits the 
unlicensed wholesale distribution of prescription “drugs,” the 
CSA in turn criminalizes the unauthorized distribution of 
“controlled substances,” and some prescription “drugs” are 
also “controlled substances.”  But that nexus, though simply 
stated, is not at all evident from the face of §§ 331(t) and 
353(e) and only emerges after a journey through other laws, 
regulations, and governmental publications.  To repeat, 
§§ 331(t) and 353(e) do not use the term “controlled 
substance” nor do they list specific prescription drugs that are 
in fact controlled substances.  To see the connection between 
prescription drugs and controlled substances, we must 
rummage through the 400-plus page “Prescription Drug 
Product List” in the FDA’s Orange Book, see Approved Drug 
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, supra  at 
3-1 to 3-424, and then hunt for a match in the roughly 100 
pages of schedules of controlled substances in the Code of 
Federal Regulations, see 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11–.15.  Even if 
we complete this odyssey, the fruits of our labor are for 
naught.  It is inconsequential under §§ 331(t) and 
353(e)(2)(A) if the prescription drugs at issue are also 
controlled substances “(as defined in section 802 of Title 
21).”  Thus, the “relationship” between §§ 331(t) and 
353(e)(2)(A) and “controlled substances” is a mere 
coincidence devoid of any legal significance under the 
FDCA.   
 Moreover, the FDCA wholesale distribution 
provisions, which (to repeat) define a single offense and not 
distinct and separate offenses, prohibit a wide range of 
behavior completely unconnected to controlled substances.  
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The statutes are blind to whether a particular prosecution 
involves highly addictive prescription painkillers, or 
relatively benign prescription shampoos, topical creams, or 
eye drops.  In this regard, we believe §§ 331(t) and 
353(e)(2)(A) to be analogous to a law criminalizing the 
receipt of stolen property.  In Pennsylvania, for example, a 
person may be convicted of theft if he intentionally receives 
property knowing that it has been stolen.  See, e.g., Pa. C.S.A. 
§ 3925(a).  Whether that stolen property includes Oxycontin 
or cotton candy is inconsequential under the statute.  Like 
§§ 331(t) and 353(e)(2)(A), the Pennsylvania receipt-of-
stolen-property statute reaches countless activities that are 
completely unconnected to controlled substances.  Classifying 
such a law as one “relating to a controlled substance” would 
stretch too far the bounds of the phrase “relating to.” 
*    *    *    *    * 
We hold that (1) a conviction for violating the FDCA’s 
wholesale distribution provisions, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(t) & 
353(e)(2)(A), is not an “aggravated felony” — specifically 
“illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of Title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as 
defined in section 924(c) of Title 18)” — under 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101(a)(43)(B) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and (2) the 
FDCA’s wholesale distribution provisions are not laws 
“relating to a controlled substance (as defined in Section 802 
of Title 21)” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).9
                                              
9 We note that our holding today should have very little effect 
on the vast majority of aliens convicted in federal court for 
violating federal controlled substances laws.  Inexplicably, 
Borrome was not charged with violating the CSA, even 
though one of the seven prescription drugs listed in his 




Accordingly, we grant the petition for review, reverse, and 
vacate the order of removal. 
                                                                                                     
convicted of violating the CSA, he almost certainly would be 
removable. 
